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MUST CONSENT BE INFORMED? 
Patient rights, state authority, and the moral basis of the physician’s duties of disclosure.  1
RH: Moral justification of physicians’ duties to inform 
KW: informed consent, legal standards of disclosure, Kant, political philosophy, autonomy 
Abstract: Legal standards of disclosure in a variety of jurisdictions require physicians to inform patients about the 
likely consequences of treatment, as a condition for obtaining the patient’s consent. Such a duty to inform is special 
insofar as extensive disclosure of risks and potential benefits is not usually a condition for obtaining consent in non-
medical transactions. 
 What could morally justify the physician’s special legal duty to inform? I argue that existing justifications 
have tried but failed to ground such special duties directly in general and basic rights, such as autonomy rights. As 
an alternative to such direct justifications, I develop an indirect justification of physicians’ special duties from an 
argument in Kant’s political philosophy. Kant argues that pre-legal rights to freedom are the source of a duty to form 
a state. The state has the authority to conclusively determine what counts as “consent” in various kinds of 
transactions. The Kantian account can subsequently indirectly justify at least one legal standard imposing a duty to 
inform, the reasonable person standard, but rules out a competitor, the subjective standard. 
Consent is a morally important feature of many of our interactions. We consent when we buy 
items at a store, enter our personal information on a website, allow others to touch us or use 
things that belong to us, or enter into an academic program. Consent seemingly requires at least 
some knowledge about the object of consent. I cannot consent to you doing something unless 
you have indicated what it is you propose to do. The validity of my consent thus often depends 
on prior disclosure by others about what it is that they propose to do to or with me. 
 The legal standard regulating physicians’ disclosures varies by jurisdiction. Courts have 
generally held physicians liable for disclosing either what physicians customarily disclose (i.e., 
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the professional practice standard); what a reasonable patient would think material to the 
decision (i.e. the reasonable person standard); or what this particular patient would find material 
to the decision (the subjective standard) (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, 125-7). The 
professional practice standard—the legal standard in about half of all U.S. states (Studdert et al. 
2007)—is a typical malpractice standard, because it holds physicians accountable for disclosing 
what physicians customarily disclose. Which is to say, it may or may not require disclosure of 
risks and potential benefits, depending on whether such disclosures are the usual practice of 
members of the profession. 
 The other two standards, however, go beyond requiring mere conformity to the practices 
of other professionals. Both the reasonable person standard (the standard operative in the other 
half of US states (Studdert et al. 2007) and Canada) and the subjective standard (operative in the 
United Kingdom (Sokol 2015)) require disclosure of specific information about the risks and 
potential benefits—in other words, the consequences—of a proposed treatment, relative to its 
alternatives. These standards often require disclosing the likely consequences of patient decisions 
for survival, biological function, pain, comfort, lifestyle, psychology, and even social 
relationships. They also require informing patients about the relative likelihood and magnitude of 
the various consequences when these are known. These standards go beyond a duty to behave as 
a typical professional and impose what we might call a duty to inform. This legal duty to inform 
is a special duty insofar as it is not required of professionals when obtaining consent in most 
other contexts. Lawyers, car mechanics, engineers, financial advisors, and others all may have 
duties to inform clients about some specific risks or conflicts of interest, but have no general 
obligation to inform clients about their options, and the magnitude and likelihood of benefits and 
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harms associated with each. Bioethicists have generally supported this duty to inform, and 
jurisdictions have been adopting the associated legal standards since the 1960s.  
 In this paper I take up the question about the moral justification of legal duties to inform. 
My main aim will be to offer a new account of the moral justification for legal duties to inform. 
However, in order to motivate this account, I will have to show some of the problems with 
existing bioethics accounts that rely on the ethical obligation to obtain informed consent. I will 
argue that these accounts have failed to morally justify legal duties to inform because they have 
tried to ground these special duties directly in general and basic rights. I argue it is probably 
impossible to justify special duties to inform by appealing directly to general and basic rights.  
 As an alternative to these accounts, I argue that legal duties to inform are best justified by 
employing an indirect, rather than direct, justification in patients’ rights. I will offer an argument, 
inspired by Kant’s political philosophy, to the effect that although individuals have basic rights to 
consent in matters affecting them, many of the specific details about our rights to consent cannot 
be determined by abstract moral argument. This basic indeterminacy provides a moral rationale 
for a state that has the authority to specify what counts as consent in different contexts, and so 
can indirectly justify physicians’ legal duties to inform. 
DIRECT JUSTIFICATION: GENERAL AND BASIC RIGHTS 
Most authors have traced the justification for duties to inform—ethical or legal—back to general 
and basic rights. Rights capable of justifying duties to inform need to be general in the sense that 
they are possessed by everyone. They could not simply be the rights created by a contract or 
specific promise, for example, because then a patient’s right to be informed would depend on 
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whether the patient had reached an understanding with a particular physician. The rights must 
further be basic, in the sense that they are pre-legal. They cannot be rights created by law, 
because any such rights could not justify the laws on which they depend. Without pre-legal moral 
rights, it would be difficult to criticize existing legal standards, which has long been an interest 
of bioethics. Here I consider three different accounts of the relationship between duties to inform 
and basic and general rights. I argue that they all fail, because none has been able to reconcile 
physicians’ special duties to inform with patients’ basic and general rights. 
Autonomous Authorization 
The most prominent moral justification for ethical and legal duties of disclosure is the 
autonomous authorization account, defended by Faden and Beauchamp (1986) and Beauchamp 
and Childress (2013). On this account, the practices and standards surrounding informed consent 
are justified by their relationship to patient autonomy. An autonomous action, on their account, is 
one that is characterized by (among other things) “understanding.” The understanding necessary 
for an autonomous action is a substantial understanding of the information material to the 
decision at hand, i.e. whatever information the patient would consider “important” to the 
decision (Faden and Beauchamp 1986, 302-4), which generally includes understanding of the 
risks and potential benefits of a proposed intervention. Without this information, patients cannot 
understand and so cannot give autonomous authorizations. Because patients have a right to make 
autonomous decisions (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, 107), physicians must inform patients in 
order to obtain consent. Legal and ethical duties to inform are both justified in the same way, 
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namely, by the fact that such duties are effective in producing autonomous authorizations (Faden 
and Beauchamp 1986, 284). 
 The autonomous authorization account can plausibly explain the special nature of 
physicians’ duties to inform: it connects them directly to the patient’s right to autonomy, which, 
on this account, requires understanding the risks and benefits of treatment before making a 
decision. The problem for this account is that it simply isn’t clear that patients have a moral right 
to this kind of autonomy. Certainly, it does not seem like such rights could be considered general 
and basic in the sense discussed earlier. If they were general and basic, one would think they 
would apply beyond the patient-physician relationship. But there is no general and basic right to 
be informed about the risks and benefits of one’s decisions in other areas of life, such as getting 
married, going skydiving, eating deli meat, or having children—despite the fact that many of 
these have potential for large benefits or pose major risks.  
 In earlier versions of their work, Beauchamp and Childress made some attempt to root 
autonomy rights in the general moral principles espoused by Kant and Mill (e.g., Beauchamp and 
Childress 2001, 63-4). Kant and Mill both provide arguments in defense of basic and general 
rights to self-rule, there is no doubt. But the problem with tracing informed consent to Kant or 
Mill is that it isn’t clear that either theory requires being informed as a condition for the exercise 
of self-rule.  It would be surprising if either of these thinkers did support this: such a standard is 2
not usually morally or legally required in any sort of decision except in medical decision making.  
 Kristinsson (2007) capably explains why Kantian ethics could not justify informed consent. He does however find 2
in Mill arguments supporting the positive value of informed deliberation, and argues that these could be taken as 
reasons for supporting something like a duty to inform. Mill however never made this argument (as Kristinsson 
admits), and it strains the imagination to think that if he had, he would support such duties only for medical decision 
making. 
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 If there is no general and basic right to this kind of autonomy—and this account provides 
no good reason for thinking there is—it is not clear that this account has a distinctively moral 
explanation of duties to inform at all.  
  
Informed consent as a rights waiver 
Neil Manson and Onora O’Neill argue that instead of protecting autonomy, informed consents 
should be viewed as waivers of a variety of rights one would otherwise have against health care 
professionals (2007, 72-77). A full moral justification of informed consent consists, then, in an 
account of the various rights persons have against others (such as rights against coercion and 
deception, among other things) combined with an account about the circumstances under which 
persons can waive these rights.  
 O’Neill (2003) develops an account of these rights and the duties to which they 
correspond. O’Neill’s account “principled autonomy” draws its inspiration from Kantian moral 
philosophy. Essentially, principled autonomy requires persons to act on principles they could will 
everyone to act on (84). To act autonomously, on this view, is to constrain one’s actions so that 
they adhere to the basic tenets of practical reason. On this view then, “autonomy” is a feature of 
actions (usually the actions of health care professionals or those who regulate or govern health 
care) that are constrained in the appropriate way, and not a personal characteristic of patients or a 
reference to the authenticity of their choices. 
 O’Neill argues that various duties follow from principled autonomy, including negative 
duties to refrain from deception and coercion, as well as corresponding rights to be free of these 
Moral justification of the physician’s duty to inform  7
things.  These duties and rights are the fundamental basis for the requirements to obtain informed 3
consent (97), as well as being the general basis for laws and policies that create a trustworthy 
society (123).  
 O’Neill’s account is attractive in part because rights not to be deceived or coerced are 
both basic and general in a way that patient rights to autonomy are not. As such this account 
could plausibly be thought to morally justify laws requiring consent. However, it is unclear why 
these general rights endow patients with a right to be informed about the consequences of their 
decisions. Even if one conceives the duty of non-deception very broadly, as O’Neill does (she 
claims it prohibits “lying, false promising, … manipulation…plagiarism” and more (98)), a 
positive right to be informed about the likely consequences of one’s choices is not plausibly 
understood as entailed by the duty to avoid deception. This point is easily seen when we consider 
that a decision to engage in other kinds of similarly risky activities (e.g. skydiving, boxing, 
driving on the autobahn) without first being fully informed about the risks and benefits would 
not necessarily mean that the decision was the result of deception, even if others were present 
who knew about the risks. 
 O’Neill is aware that there is a gap between very general duties like non-deception and 
the specific laws and policies governing informed consent. In response, she suggests that moral 
duties like non-deception function as very general moral constraints on the policies that can be 
chosen. Specific laws and policies governing consent in medicine should be chosen by 
considering a large variety of factors, including general moral constraints but also other kinds of 
practical matters and various non-moral desiderata (for example, “clinical, scientific, financial, 
 O’Neill focuses on duties, not rights, but suggests in numerous instances that she sees patient rights as correlatives 3
to physicians’ duties to avoid coercion and deception. For example see O’Neill (2003, 95).
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and technical constraints” (125)). However, if duties to inform follow from such practical, non-
moral considerations, and not from the moral duties of non-coercion or non-deception 
themselves, then the problem remains unsolved. The rights-waiver view succeeds, perhaps, in 
justifying patients’ rights to give bare consent, but fails to provide a distinctly moral rationale for 
the ethical or legal duty to inform associated with informed consent.  
Fair Transactions 
Miller and Wertheimer (2010; 2011) accept some elements of the autonomous authorization 
view, but argue that an autonomous authorization is not ultimately necessary for successful 
consent transactions (or what they call “moral transformation”). As they point out, consent 
transactions are often considered morally transformative even if one party or the other did not 
fully understand the consequences of the transaction. For example, when judging whether a 
contract is morally transformative, what is important is that the parties agree to the terms of the 
contract, not that they understand the consequences of signing the contract. The success of 
particular consent transactions cannot derive directly from consent, since consent is an internal 
state that can only be known with certainty by the agent him or herself. 
 For Miller and Wertheimer, consent transactions are morally transformative when both 
parties have a chance to token consent under “reasonably favorable” conditions. It is particularly 
important that neither party treats the other party “unfairly” in the course of the transaction. 
While either party may be in a difficult situation, as long as both parties to the transaction act 
reasonably and fairly, the token of consent they give results in moral transformation. 
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 Miller and Wertheimer’s view is attractive in part because it offers an explanation about 
why requirements for medical consent differ from requirements for other kinds of consent: they 
differ because what counts as “fair” varies according to the context of the transaction. So treating 
a consenter “fairly” when agreeing to a sexual relationship differs significantly from treating a 
consenter “fairly” in a business transaction, they say. In a medical transaction, information 
asymmetries generate unfairness between physician and patient, such that it would be unfair if 
the physician were to proceed without first fully informing the patient about the various benefits 
and risks of the proposed treatment. 
 However, Miller and Wertheimer give no explanation about fairness in general, or when 
imbalances between parties generate such special duties of fairness. Information asymmetries 
alone do not always generate special duties to inform: as Miller and Wertheimer themselves 
discuss, if a long-term student of art history finds a painting that is significantly under-valued by 
its seller, it is not “unfair” for her to buy the painting without telling the seller what the painting 
is actually worth. But if such information asymmetries are not unfair in art sales, what makes 
them unfair in the clinical context? Miller and Wertheimer give no further explanation. They 
seem to rely on intuitions or social conventions about fairness and unfairness in medical 
transactions, when a moral argument is needed. 
 As I have argued, the problem of justifying duties to inform in the medical context 
requires explaining why physicians’ special duties can be justified by general and basic rights, 
when these rights do not yield similar duties of disclosure in non-medical contexts. Miller and 
Wertheimer’s account responds to the problem by positing a basic right to consent under fair 
conditions. If what is “fair” is highly context-dependent, as they claim, then perhaps this account 
Moral justification of the physician’s duty to inform  10
can explain why medical standards might be idiosyncratic compared to the standards that are 
operative in non-medical contexts. But without some general way of determining when a 
transaction is fair or unfair, it ultimately does not explain why fair transactions require physicians 
specifically to inform patients—rather than, for example, to offer them treatment at their own 
risk, under a caveat emptor standard, which also could constitute fairness in medical 
transactions. Miller and Wertheimer thus fail to justify informed consent, because showing that it 
is possible that medical consent standards could be different from standards in other contexts is 
not yet to show that medical consent must be informed, where informed means understanding the 
possible consequences of one’s decision. 
The problem with direct justifications 
I have argued so far that bioethicists have tried to defend ethical and legal duties to inform by 
appealing directly to general and basic rights. But this is problematic: general and basic rights 
might be the basis for general and basic duties, but it is unclear how they could directly justify 
physicians’ special duties to inform. None of the accounts discussed so far has been able to 
bridge that gap satisfactorily. These accounts either defend special standards on the basis of 
putative rights that are not truly general and basic, like autonomy rights; or they defend them on 
the basis of general and basic rights, such as rights of non-deception, non-coercion, or fairness, 
that on closer examination do not specifically support duties to inform.  
 The failure of such direct accounts is, I think, inevitable. The reason for this is bound up 
in what it would mean to justify special duties directly in general and basic rights. Let us say that 
a direct justification in general and basic rights would amount to a justification in those rights, 
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without consideration of additional moral claims not strictly entailed by those rights. If special 
duties are distinguished from general duties in virtue of the fact that they are not entailed by 
general and basic rights, then special duties must necessarily rely on moral considerations 
beyond general and basic rights—in which case they would not be directly justified by these 
general and basic rights. For example, Miller and Wertheimer’s fair transactions account 
stipulates that there is a general moral right to be treated fairly, but claims that what counts as 
“fair” differs according to context. Even if we grant them this, they would need additional moral 
considerations beyond the general right to fairness in order to show why fairness requires a duty 
to inform in medicine. An account of the special moral requirements of fairness in medicine 
could provide this, but then their account would no longer ground special duties directly in 
general and basic rights, since it would make use of an auxiliary moral account of fairness in 
medicine. 
Giving up on general and basic rights? 
If general and basic rights cannot directly justify special duties of disclosure, we might think it 
best to stop grounding special legal duties to inform in such rights altogether. Two different 
responses to such a failure may seem reasonable: we might conclude that special duties to inform 
are not morally justifiable at all; or we might try to justify such duties on some moral basis not 
ultimately appealing to rights, such as utilitarianism.  
 First, it might be tempting to conclude that there simply is no moral justification for 
ethical or legal duties to inform. General and basic rights can justify mere consent, and nothing 
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more. Informed consent, and the laws aimed at protecting it, could be a medical custom with no 
substantive moral basis.  
 This conclusion should be accepted only hesitantly, and as a last resort, if no convincing 
moral justification can be found for ethical or legal duties to inform. Few if any ethical 
requirements are more strongly associated with physician ethics than informed consent. The fact 
that direct justifications in general and basic rights fail does not by itself show that no moral 
justification could be successful. 
 If we continue searching for a moral justification for duties to inform, a second strategy 
seems promising: perhaps special duties can be grounded in some alternative moral basis to 
general and basic rights, such as utility. Utility is, for example, arguably the ultimate ethical basis 
for justifications that refer to information asymmetries between physicians and patients.  The 4
basic utilitarian argument for duties to inform might go thus: information asymmetries are an 
especially prominent feature of medicine, and either an ethical obligation or a public policy (or 
both) requiring physicians to remedy this asymmetry by informing patients will maximize utility 
in the long run. 
 This argument proceeds too quickly, however. First, even if we assume that information 
asymmetries are more prominent in medicine than in other fields, and further assume that utility 
can only be maximized by eliminating or reducing such asymmetries, we would still need to 
show that the best way of reducing asymmetries is a law or ethical obligation requiring 
physicians to reduce it themselves, by disclosing risks and potential benefits to patients. 
 Arrow (1963) argued that many of the special features of the organization of medicine can be explained as 4
economically rational responses to information asymmetries. But as Arrow himself admits, there is more than one 
economically rational way of dealing with information asymmetries.
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Information asymmetries are known in virtually every industry, but as already discussed, other 
industries do not solve the problem by simply requiring the more-informed party to 
systematically disclose the risks, potential benefits, and available options to the less-informed 
party. Instead, other mechanisms emerge to resolve such disparities. Those who purchase 
specialized services might become better educated about the product they buy, for example by 
doing their own research, or they might utilize impartial consultants who are knowledgeable 
about the services or goods sought (such as potential homeowners do when they hire a home 
inspector). They might further gain insight into the competence and trustworthiness of specific 
physicians or practices by obtaining reviews written by experts (such as the reviews published in 
venues like Consumer Reports or the Kelley Blue Book) or those found on crowd-sourced 
websites (such as Zocdoc or Angie’s list). In the absence of laws requiring disclosures, such 
venues would become more valuable and so more robust. A utilitarian justification of a duty to 
inform—whether legal or ethical—would need to show not merely that such a duty solves 
problems associated with information asymmetries, but that it provides more utility than these 
other alternatives, all things considered. 
 I am not aware of any such account, but even if one exists or could be given, it would 
likely raise a second problem: difficulty justifying the stringent ethical and legal duties usually 
associated with informed consent, which have been the object of wide consensus in bioethics. To 
illustrate this, consider James Stacey Taylor’s (2005) argument that the ethical obligation of 
informed consent is best justified by appeal to patient well-being rather than respect for patient 
autonomy. Taylor argues that informed consent cannot be based in respect for autonomy because 
failure to give a patient desired information could only be considered disrespect for patient 
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autonomy in some cases, such as those involving intentional manipulation. Taylor argues that a 
duty to inform can instead be justified by its contribution to patient well-being, because it puts 
patients in a better position to achieve their own preferences, and because patients value having 
this information even when it doesn’t. 
 However, as Taylor admits, justifying informed consent in terms of patient well-being 
makes the duty to inform conditional on a prior determination that informed consent is in the 
patient’s (or in some class of patients’) interest. This weakens the case for either ethical or legal 
duties to inform, relative to arguments based in patient rights. As Taylor concedes, if the well-
being argument is accepted, “then the case for medical paternalism gains strength” (2005, 391). 
 This same problem is likely to accompany any effort to justify informed consent from a 
non-rights-based account. The appeal of general and basic rights such as autonomy rights is, 
essentially, the unqualified nature of the duties associated with them. On such accounts, a 
patient’s right to informed consent is not conditioned on any other values, and so is presumably 
stronger than those in which it is. 
 If special duties to inform cannot be grounded directly in general and basic rights, and 
alternative ethical bases for these may not justify anything as stringent as an unqualified duty to 
obtain informed consent, then the problem remains unsolved. In what follows, I present an 
account that protects the stringency of informed consent requirements by giving them a 
foundation in general and basic rights. However, in order to solve the problem I argue that legal 
duties to inform are best understood to follow only indirectly from general and basic rights: 
general and basic rights form the ethical basis for a state with the authority to determine that 
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special disclosures about the consequences of treatment are a necessary precondition for giving 
valid consent. 
INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION: RIGHTS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 
The argument I develop here is based on an argument in Kant’s political philosophy.  I want to 5
argue that Kant’s approach offers something of value for anyone attracted to a “rights-based” 
approach. This is so because Kant shows how legal duties to inform can be justified by referring 
to general and basic rights. Given the lack of other compelling explanations, and the importance 
attached to this by bioethics, this by itself is probably sufficient reason for looking at the Kantian 
approach more carefully. But Kant’s approach also has additional value because he clarifies the 
general nature of the problem with other views we have encountered. Kant’s argument explains 
why it is that general and basic rights are not likely to solve many of the pressing issues in 
bioethics, particularly where those have to do with questions about the nature and extent of one 
person’s duties towards others. 
Basic and general rights in a state of nature 
Like many liberal thinkers, Kant develops his political theory by developing a system of rights 
that is logically prior to, and independent of, any actual state. It is only by abstracting from 
particular states that we can address the normative question about the state’s authority, and 
ultimately discover the principles that ought to inform the laws the state promulgates.  
 So many authors have turned to Kant’s moral philosophy to support various legal views that appealing to Kant’s 5
political philosophy may seem surprising. For a more extensive account about why Kant’s political, and not moral, 
philosophy is the appropriate basis for law, see MacDougall (2019).
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 The condition in which people interact in abstraction from the authority of any state is a 
“state of nature.” In such a state, people have one basic right:  
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as 
it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal 
law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity. 
(Kant 1996, 6:237)   
Kant calls this right to freedom innate right, because it belongs to persons simply by virtue of 
their humanity. It is thus “general,” in the sense described earlier, because it belongs to everyone. 
And it is also basic, in the sense that it is a pre-legal right that could form the basis for laws, 
rather than a right that merely follows from them. 
 The innate right to freedom described here by Kant is a manifestation of the moral 
equality of human beings in two senses. First, the freedom to which each person is entitled is 
external freedom, which means that one may use those means to which one has a right—for 
example, one’s own body or property—for one’s own ends, free of control or constraint by other 
persons (Ripstein 2009, 14-15). It is thus distinct from autonomy familiar in Kant’s moral 
philosophy, which Kant associates with internal freedom, that is, the freedom of the will that is 
“determined by laws of reason” (6:214). External freedom is also distinct from the bioethics 
principle of autonomy, which is often analyzed as requiring both “non-control” and 
“understanding” (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, 104). Although it bears similarity to the non-
control condition, it does not explicitly require any specific level of understanding. So, innate 
right manifests the moral equality of human beings by making each person equally free of 
control by others in a purely external sense. This kind of freedom does not require any particular 
internal state, in contrast to the concept of freedom familiar from other contexts. 
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 Second, innate right manifests the equality of persons by the limitation it places on 
freedom: each person’s freedom is limited by the requirement that it must “coexist with the 
freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law.” This qualification is necessary for 
equality because, if I am free but my freedom is unconstrained by the freedom of others, then 
others are in a relationship of subjection to me. Because each person's freedom must be able to 
"coexist" with the freedom of others, freedom has an essentially relational and reciprocal 
character. Although I am entitled to freedom, my freedom is limited by the freedom of others, 
just as theirs is limited by mine. The idea that this reciprocal limitation occurs under “universal 
law” means that their freedom limits mine in the same way mine limits theirs, that is, whatever 
laws limit our freedom in relationship to each other, these laws are the same for everyone.  
 The innate right of freedom grounds general rights to refuse the touch or use of one’s 
person. Equality demands that our rights to freedom are limited in cases where they would 
conflict with others’ rights to freedom, described under the same universal law. But a right to 
refuse to let others touch one’s person does not, at least in the general run of cases, provoke such 
conflicts. Each person can have a right to exclude others from his or her body without thereby 
producing any conflicts with the similar rights of others. Kant treats this right to exclude others 
from our bodies as a straightforward implication of the principle of innate right (6:248). To be 
free in one’s person is most basically to have a right to refuse the touch of others. 
 If persons are free to refuse the touch of others, they are also free to consent to it, by the 
same argument. Freedom from unwanted touching is possible because such freedom can be a 
universal law without producing conflict between equally free persons. But consent to such 
touching can also be consistent with a universal law: if I agree to let someone perform an 
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operation on me, for example, and the other agrees to do this, no one else is affected by our 
interaction but the two parties to the agreement. A law universally permitting such consensual 
transactions would not produce conflicts with the freedom of anyone, so long as the only parties 
affected are those who have given their consent. This is the general argument for the importance 
of consent in a state of nature. 
 As a political theory, Kant’s is attractive because it is grounded in the basic idea of equal 
freedom. Moreover, innate right captures the central idea of a general and basic right of self-
determination, and its correlative requirement of consent, that has been important both in 
bioethics as well as in the western liberal tradition. Prior to any legislation or government, all 
persons have a right to give or withhold consent from others who would touch their bodies. 
Because this right is foundational it is an unconditional requirement, meaning that it conditions, 
or serves as a side-constraint on, all other politically permissible interactions. Consequently, it 
also distinguishes itself from other ethical systems, such as utilitarianism, which typically make 
rights to consent conditioned on the ability of these rights to secure other goods. 
The problem with general rights in a state of nature 
General rights in a state of nature raise a problem of authority, however, that Kant illustrates by 
developing two implications of the principle of innate right.  
 First, if general rights are to be the same for everyone, they must be specified under law
—a “universal law,” in Kant’s terminology. Even if we specify from the outset that there is a 
general right to freedom, and that this freedom is a right to be externally free of control by 
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others, we are left with many questions, because several different laws might be employed to 
achieve this freedom. 
 For example, to make it possible for each person to enjoy a right to drive on the road, 
some law must determine which side of the road persons should drive on. If people had a right to 
drive on whichever side of the road they wished, it would not be possible to determine who was 
at fault in the event of a crash between two vehicles driving in opposite directions on the same 
side of the road : both had a right to do what they were doing. But the idea of universal law itself 6
does not settle which of the two sides is the correct one. Driving on either side of the road is an 
activity that could be compatible with the freedom of everyone, if everyone else was also bound 
by the same law. 
 Similarly, the right to give or withhold consent from those who would touch or use my 
body is a necessary implication of the original right to freedom, as I have argued. But beyond the 
simple right not to be touched without consent, we face myriad questions about the laws that will 
govern medical consent. Who is capable of giving consent? What must a person know, exactly, 
about a proposed interaction before he can give valid consent? Does consent to medical 
interventions require more disclosures than other kinds of interactions? What signs indicate that a 
person has given consent? What must a person do to revoke consent? What kinds of actions—
such as fraud or coercion—can undermine consent? And how are these to be defined?  
 Settling the answers to these questions is not primarily a logistical or practical problem, it 
is a moral one. Because individual persons are only rightfully free insofar as their freedom can 
coexist with the freedom of others under universal law, without actual laws governing us our 
 That is, absent some other specific and universal law that could determine responsibility in such events.6
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exercise of freedom inevitably violates the rights of others, and their exercise of freedom violates 
our rights as well. This violation of the rights of others happens even if we do not intend to 
violate them: it is a consequence of the fact that we live on a bounded earth, where any rights 
claim by one individual must inevitably bump up against the rights claims of others, even 
"involuntarily" (6:306). In a state of nature, there is no way of resolving rights disputes, and so 
we inevitably wrong others (as they do us) when there is no settled law or mechanism for 
resolving the rightful bounds of the freedom of each. The principle of innate right, then, makes a 
moral demand for universal laws defining the rightful freedom of each, but does not provide 
these. 
 A second implication of innate right follows from the fact that people have equal rights as 
a consequence of being bound under universal law. Given such equal rights, no person has the 
moral power to unilaterally determine which universal laws will govern others. This is 
particularly problematic because it seems, at first blush, to make the adoption of a universal law 
impossible.  
 Consider once again the driving example. Several ways of resolving the question about 
which side to drive on might be proposed. For example, we might think that some solutions to 
the problem will result in better outcomes. Perhaps it could be shown that driving on the right-
hand side of the road resulted in slightly fewer deaths than driving on the left-hand side of the 
road, due to the handedness of drivers or some other fact. Alternatively, we might take a vote to 
see which side of the road most people prefer to drive on. While either method of resolving the 
question might seem attractive, people with equal rights in a state of nature would not be 
required to adopt them, nor could they be forced to do so. On Kant's view this is especially clear: 
Moral justification of the physician’s duty to inform  21
if people have an innate right to freedom, which is freedom from other people, then people are 
free to reject the proposals of others about which side of the road to drive on, even if the proposal 
is one that will lead to the best consequences, and even if everyone else has agreed to it. While 
innate right makes it impossible for others to restrict my freedom by imposing a law on me to 
which I do not agree, it also makes it impossible for me to restrict their freedom in the same way. 
Regardless of who tries to pass such laws—whether it is an individual or a group or even a 
majority—all such attempts amount to a unilateral imposition of law on equally free others 
(6:256), which no one has the authority to do. 
 The same problem likely arises for other views of general rights in a state of nature: if our 
basic rights are truly general, in the sense that each person enjoys their rights equally, it is not 
clear how one person or even a group of persons could have the authority to impose their laws on 
others. The problem is pervasive, and also applies to medical consent. Even if it were possible to 
show that one particular standard of physician disclosure had better consequences than others, 
either for individual patients or for society as a whole, this would not by itself establish the 
authority of this standard. Persons with equal rights are under no obligation to accept such 
standards, even if they are good for them or good for everyone. 
 The problem of authority, then, can be summarized in this way: respecting the general or 
equal rights of others requires coordinated adoption of universal laws that determine the nature 
and extent of those rights. But general or equal rights also mean that no one has the authority to 
impose such universal laws.  
The civil condition as solution to the problem  
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The problem of authority can be solved by moving from a state of nature into a civil condition. 
Entering into a civil condition with others means agreeing with them to be governed under a set 
of public, enforced laws (6:256, 6:312). The civil condition exists when we are governed under a 
basically just state.  
 Kant argues that there is a duty to enter a civil condition (6:307-8), because it is the only 
way of solving the problem of authority. In a civil condition, an institution and process are 
agreed upon to determine the specific character of the universal laws giving freedom to each. In 
this way it solves the problem of universal laws, by setting a single standard for everyone. By 
settling a set of universal laws governing each person it makes them equally free. A civil 
condition also solves the problem of authority, because it makes it possible for universal laws to 
govern us that are not the product of a unilateral will. Because everyone consents to the civil 
condition, the laws that govern us in a civil condition can be understood as the product of an 
omnilateral, or "united and general," will (6:313).  
 The consent we give to the civil condition is not actual consent, founded in historical or 
empirical fact, nor is it hypothetical consent, offered as a prediction about what persons would 
consent to under ideal circumstances.  Consent is instead a necessary consequence of the duty to 7
treat others as equally free. Because each person has a duty to respect the rights of others, and the 
civil condition is the only way in which we can do that without unilaterally imposing obligations 
on others, we have a duty to consent to the civil condition, even if present political arrangements 
were never the object of actual consent (6:319). We have a duty to consent to it because failure to 
 Because it is not based on actual or hypothetical consent, Kant!s contractualism is not subject to some of the 7
serious criticisms leveled at other kinds of social contract theories. See O’Neill (2000) .
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do so is a de facto violation of the rights of others, regardless of whether one intends so to violate 
their rights or not (cf. 6:306). 
Laws and their limits in a civil condition 
The consent we give to the civil condition is the source of the authority of individual laws. 
Individual laws, like the state from which they proceed, gain their authority from the fact that 
they are the result of legal and political processes we had a duty to consent to. To disobey the 
laws of a state that operates within its legitimate limits--even on the premise that one's own 
preferred laws or policies are ethically superior--is to insist on a merely private understanding of 
right, and to attempt to impose one's unilateral will on non-consenting others. It thus violates 
their equal rights to freedom.  
 While Kant's argument explains the authority of both the state and its laws, it might seem 
to give too much power to the state. If the state has authority whether or not we actually consent 
to it, is it even possible for laws passed through the normal political process to be illegitimate? 
 To understand the limits of the authority of the state, we have to refer to the original 
purpose of the state. As per Kant's argument, the ultimate purpose of the state and the laws it 
produces is to secure the equal freedom of each, which means to create what Kant calls a 
"rightful condition" (6:311). This is all the power that the argument beginning with innate right 
can authorize for the state: we do not have a duty to join a civil condition because it will make us 
richer, safer, or solve various kinds of coordination problems. Our duty to enter the civil 
condition results from the necessity of securing the equal freedom of others (just as their duty is 
a consequence of securing ours). The state gains a wide variety of powers that are all subservient 
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to this overall goal--including power over the police and economy, for example--but its authority 
does not go beyond this. The basic reason it cannot go beyond laws intended to protect the equal 
freedom of citizens is that other goals cannot be understood as something anyone has a duty to 
consent to. We have a duty to consent only to laws that are necessary for making others equally 
free; and so we also have a right to impose only laws that are aimed at this general purpose.  
 Given this purpose, Kant’s general strategy for determining whether a law exceeds the 
limits of state authority is to ask whether it is something that a people could will for itself,  8
which amounts to the question whether every citizen could consent to it. This is a basic 
touchstone for legitimacy because a law to which some could not consent also cannot be 
conceived of as the product of a united and general will, which is the most general basis for state 
authority. For example, paternalist laws fall into this category. Paternalist laws are by definition 
those that override the freedom of citizens, not because it is necessary for the freedom of others, 
but instead because it is in some way good for the person being coerced. But because the only 
justification for state power in the first place is the fact that it is necessary to protect the equal 
freedom of all, paternalist laws basically restrict freedom without any rightful justification. Kant 
consequently calls the paternalistic state a "despotic" one (6:317).  
State authority and legitimate legal standards 
Determining whether legal standards endowing physicians with a duty to inform are legitimate 
then depends on determining whether they fulfill the purpose of law, by limiting the freedom of 
each for the purpose of preserving the freedom of everyone. Laws that fulfill this general purpose 
 Kant uses this formulation a number of times when discussing specific laws (6:327-329). 8
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are laws to which everyone could consent, i.e. they could be the object of a united and general 
will and are generally justifiable as a matter of public right. We can now ask whether the duty-to-
inform standards serve this purpose, and so could be considered legitimate. 
 The reasonable person standard, as we said earlier, requires the physician to disclose the 
information that a hypothetical reasonable person would find material to the decision. This 
standard limits the freedom of both the patient and the physician, but in both cases it does so for 
the purpose of protecting the freedom of the other party. First, the reasonable person standard 
limits the freedom of each party. The physician is limited in the sense that she may only consider 
the patient to have given valid consent if she has disclosed information up to the level required 
by the standard—that is, up to the level that a reasonable person would think material to the 
decision. The patient’s freedom, likewise, is limited in the sense that he must consider valid any 
consent he gave to a physician who fully provided this level of disclosure. He may not claim that 
his consent was invalid because the physician did not give him some piece of information he 
later decides he would have liked to have, for example. These limitations stand in contrast to the 
total lack of limitations in a state of nature. In a state of nature, either party could make a 
provisionally rightful claim that the other party did not fully satisfy its rights, regardless of what 
the other party actually did, because there is no single universal standard laid down determining 
when a valid consent has been given. But once a standard like the reasonable person standard is 
laid down in a civil condition, the freedom of each is limited: each may complain about a rights 
violation only in the case that the other does not perform what is required by the standard.  
 Second, the limitations on freedom posed by the reasonable person standard limit the 
freedom of each party for the purpose of preserving the freedom of the other. The limits on the 
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patient serve to preserve the freedom of the physician: the physician knows that, so long as she 
has met the objective standards for disclosure required by law, she has performed her legal duty 
and has not violated the patient’s rights, even if the patient did not get as much information as he 
would have liked. The limits on the physician serve to preserve the freedom of the patient: the 
patient knows that the physician will disclose all the information that a reasonable person would 
find material to the decision, and the patient will have legal recourse in the case that it turns out 
that the physician does not achieve this standard. Because the standard is objective, both 
physician and patient can determine independently that they are complying with the rights of the 
other party. Both parties can make a free choice about whether or not to participate in the 
medical intervention, knowing in advance what this will mean for their respective rights. The 
judgment about whether participation will further their own individual ends is up to each party to 
judge for themselves.  
 Because the reasonable person standard can be understood as limiting freedom of each to 
uphold the equal freedom of others, it could be the object of a united and general will. We can 
conclude, then, that the Kantian argument succeeds where other theories have failed, and shows 
how basic and general rights justify a duty to inform, at least in those jurisdictions employing a 
reasonable person standard. 
Subjective standards and the limits of legitimacy 
Not all standards requiring physicians to inform are similarly justifiable on the Kantian view, 
however. The subjective standard differs in important respects from the reasonable person 
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standard, and on at least one interpretation could not be considered legitimate, even if it were 
chosen through the normal political process within a civil condition. 
 On the subjective standard, the adequacy of the information given to the patient is 
determined by whether it constitutes the information that is “material” to the particular patient 
(Faden and Beauchamp 1986, 33), i.e. the information that is important to the patient, given his 
or her ends or values. The subjective standard thus makes the adequacy of the physician’s 
disclosure and the resulting consent a function of the patient’s ends. In this way, it is a significant 
departure from the reasonable person standard, which can be considered an objective standard, 
because the standard for disclosure is not one chosen by either party to the consent. This shift 
away from an objective standard determined independently of either party to a subjective 
standard determined by the ends of one party to the transaction creates three problems with 
respect to the united and general will. 
 First, by making the physician accountable to the patient’s ends, the subjective standard 
construes the relationship as one in which one private party (the physician) has a duty to aid or 
help another (the patient) achieve his or her goals or ends, such that the patient cannot give a 
valid consent to treatment unless the physician offers the required assistance towards the 
patient’s individual aims. This goes beyond the justifiable rationale for law: on the Kantian 
argument, the purpose of laws is to achieve the freedom of each party, and the only possible basis 
for limiting one party’s freedom of choice is to preserve the freedom of choice of the other. 
Individuals do not have a fundamental or innate right to help from others in achieving their ends, 
but only to freedom from others. They also do not have fundamental legal duties to assist others, 
but only to preserve others’ freedom. Because laws limiting one person’s freedom to help another 
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achieve his or her ends are not consistent with the primary rationale of law, which is to preserve 
the freedom of each, they are such that free and equal persons could not agree to them.   
 Second, by making the ends of only one party legally significant, the subjective standard 
necessarily makes the parties unequal. As noted above, the subjective standard makes the validity 
of consent dependent on whether the information disclosed turns out to be all the information 
that the patient wanted, i.e. the information that the patient finds useful for achieving his ends. 
The standard does not reference the ends of the physician, however, and the reason is obvious: a 
legal standard could make rightfulness a function of the ends of one party, at most, because 
parties can have different or even mutually exclusive ends. The validity of consent could not 
depend, for example, on the information that the patient wants to receive, as well as the 
information that the physician wants to give. The kind of disclosure the parties find conducive to 
their personal ends could be different, and in the event that it was different, there would be no 
way to determine whether the resulting consent was valid. Because the patient’s ends determine 
the rightfulness of the transaction in a way that the physician’s do not, the subjective standard 
makes the parties unequal. In contrast, objective standards such as the reasonable person 
standard do not make rightfulness a function of the ends of either party, but only the actions of 
each; as such, objective standards preserve the equality of both parties.  
 Third, by making the satisfaction of the physician’s legal duty dependent on the patient’s 
ends, the subjective standard essentially permits the patient to determine the law for the 
physician. Innate right, says Kant, is a right to freedom or “independence from constraint by the 
choice of another.” The subjective standard does not give the patient the right to directly 
constrain the physician, but the patient does have power to indirectly constrain the choice of the 
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physician, insofar as the patient has the authority to determine the legal standard to which the 
physician is held. Objective standards do not raise this problem: even if the standard requires 
different amounts of effort or places different burdens on the parties, the legal rights of neither 
party are determined by the other party to the transaction. The subjective standard thus legally 
instantiates a relationship of subjection between interacting parties. On Kant’s view, this runs 
directly counter to the purpose of law, which is to make private parties free and equal relative to 
each other.  
  Other commentators have argued that the major problem with the subjective standard is 
an epistemic one: the physician cannot know whether she has given the patient all the 
information he would like to know (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, 127; Dranseika, Piasecki, 
and Waligora 2016). Other standards also raise epistemic problems, however. The reasonable 
person standard requires the physician to judge what a reasonable person would want to know, 
but this standard is vague, and the findings of juries in particular cases are thus somewhat 
unpredictable. Similarly, the professional practice standard requires disclosure of whatever 
physicians customarily disclose, but accurate information about the customs of other physicians 
may be unavailable to the physician and/or patient or even non-existent.  
 The Kantian view shows why the main problem with the subjective standard is not 
epistemic but relational. Because the subjective standard determines the physician’s rights and 
duties on the basis of the patient’s subjective ends, it undermines the physician’s freedom, makes 
the patient and physician unequal, and makes the individual patient lawgiver to the physician. 
The subjective standard is thus a law that a people could not will for itself. Any justifiable legal 
standard must, on the Kantian view, be an objective one that both parties can independently 
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choose to meet, rather than a subjective one that gives one party legal control over the 
rightfulness of the other’s actions. 
 On a different interpretation of the subjective standard, however, some of these problems 
may be avoided. As Beauchamp and Childress qualify this standard, it requires disclosure of 
information material to the particular patient only insofar as "it is reasonable to expect the 
physician to determine the patient's informational needs” (2013, 127). The crucial point here is 
who determines what counts as "reasonable." If "reasonable" is understood as, "reasonable from 
the point of view of the patient," then the standard does not meaningfully preserve the freedom 
and equality of the physician, as discussed above. If, on the other hand, "reasonable" is 
determined by what most other prudent physicians would do to determine the patient's needs, or 
by what most reasonable people would do to determine the patient's needs, then the subjective 
standard is actually an objective standard, because the standard for disclosure is not set directly 
by either party’s ends.  
 However, note that these "objective" interpretations of the subjective standard would 
serve to partially undermine the main argument for adopting the subjective standard in the first 
place, which is its supposed value for preserving patient autonomy (Beauchamp and Childress 
2013, 127; Dranseika, Piasecki, and Waligora 2016). If patients have a right only to a physician 
who makes a reasonable attempt to determine their needs, where "reasonable" is determined 
according to some standard independent and outside of the patient, then the ability of the patient 
to exercise autonomy by making decisions on the basis of completely individualized or 
idiosyncratic preferences is effectively undermined. Patients are not then entitled to all the 
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information they want (or would want, if they knew what the physician knew), but only what 
someone else could reasonably guess they would want. 
CONCLUSION 
The indirect Kantian approach, I have argued, offers advantages over existing accounts 
attempting direct justification of duties to inform in general and basic rights. Chief among these 
advantages is that indirect justification can do what direct justifications have so far failed to: it 
can explain how special duties to inform might in some sense follow from a patient’s general and 
basic rights. Between patients’ general and basic rights and physicians’ special duties to inform, 
Kant inserts a state that has the authority to interpret the content of general and basic rights. It is 
this extra step that makes Kantian indirect justification plausible where other theories are not. In 
the case that the state chooses a standard endowing physicians with a duty to inform that also 
serves the general purpose of law—such as the reasonable person standard—extensive 
disclosures can be understood as a condition for the existence of consent, even though no 
argument can show such special duties would be necessary in a state of nature, and despite the 
fact that being informed is not usually a required feature of consent in non-medical contexts. 
Indirect justification could also be used to show the basis of other standards in general and basic 
rights, even some that do not endow physicians with duties to inform, so long as these can be 
understood as fulfilling the basic purpose of law. Standards not clearing this bar—such as the 
subjective standard, on the Kantian view—cannot be justified even indirectly, however. Insofar 
as such standards run contrary to the moral purposes that give the state authority, they should be 
considered illegitimate. 
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